Industry Deep Dives

National Industry Deep Dives were developed for Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania providing background information on fossil gas consumption across the different industry sub-sectors, an assessment of key drivers of fossil gas demand reduction until 2030, as well as general policy recommendations for fossil gas demand reduction in industry.

Bulgaria

Key points

Despite the skyrocketing gas prices in 2022, Bulgaria experienced one of the highest industrial production growth rates in terms of volume among EU member states.

Gas consumption for industrial uses has decreased by 17% year-on-year in 2022. As large energy consumers accelerate investments in decentralised power supply systems, energy efficiency and deep electrification of processes, the gas phaseout is expected to continue until 2030.

The electrification of industrial processes, where technically viable, is the quickest and cheapest option to decarbonise the Bulgarian industry. Electrification should proceed hand in hand with renewable energy adoption because only a decarbonised grid can reduce emissions in the industrial sector.

There is a need for the introduction of targeted incentives for businesses in developing circular economy supply chains with high material efficiency that would significantly accelerate decarbonisation efforts.

The Bulgarian industrial sector plays a significant role in the country’s energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It accounts for 60% of coal and 70% of natural gas consumption in Bulgaria’s final energy demand. In 2021, the industry contributed approximately 14% of the total GHG emissions.¹ The most carbon and energy-intensive industry subsectors include metal extraction, refining, petrochemicals, cement, ceramics, and glassworks production. They are largely dominated by a few large-scale businesses, many of which are part of multinational European groups that have already announced plans for industrial transformation and decarbonisation. However, the industrial energy efficiency in Bulgaria remains among the lowest in the EU.²Center for the Study of Democracy, Back to the Drawing Board: The Contours of Bulgaria’s Climate Neutrality Roadmap. Sofia, 2023.³

Market signals have prompted business owners to reconsider their energy supply mix and invest in alternatives to expensive natural gas. Where technologically feasible, businesses are transitioning to electricity as an alternative energy source. Additionally, propane has gained popularity due to its cost-effectiveness, although it does not actually reduce GHG emissions. Indications from the Bulgarian industrial associations show that propane may have replaced around 20% of the fossil gas demand in the industry in 2022. Yet, gas consumption for industrial uses has decreased by 17% year-on-year in 2022, and this trend is expected to continue in 2023 as large energy consumers accelerate investments in decentralised power supply systems, energy efficiency and deep electrification of processes. Importantly, the decline in gas consumption has not negatively impacted the country’s overall industrial output. In fact, Bulgaria experienced one of the highest industrial production growth rates in terms of volume among EU member states in 2022.

The most carbon intensive sub-sectors are the chemicals, cement and electricity generation. Emissions from the chemical industryhave been slightly increasing since 2015, and this subsector contributed to 21% of overall GHG emissions across manufacturing in 2021.¹ Meanwhile, the cement sector contributed to 16% of overall GHG emissions in the industrial segment in 2021, an increase of about 35% since 2015.² Bulgaria has a relatively small steel sector, with one plant using electric arc furnace capable to produce 1 Mt p.a.

The single industrial gas consumer in Bulgaria is the oil refinery on the Black Sea coast, which is also the largest in Southeast Europe. It supplies liquid fuels, petrochemicals and polymers for Bulgaria and the region, and although, it has increased the hydrogen production since 2015 when a hydrocracker unit was installed, the refinery depends largely on natural gas to produce high-grade petrochemicals. Switching to alternative fuels such as green hydrogen has not been in the Russian owner’s business plans.

By an order of magnitude, the chemicals, minerals,¹ and food, beverage & tobacco industries have the biggest fossil gas demand across all other industries. Fossil gas represented most of their final energy use (81% of chemicals energy use, 67% of other minerals, 50% of food, beverage, and tobacco industries).² For the chemical and the food, beverage and tobacco industries, the rest of final energy demand comes mostly from electricity and biomass. For minerals extraction and processing, final energy use comes from a mix of biomass, coke, diesel, district heating, electricity, lignite coal, pet coke, steam coal and waste. In any case, across all industrial sectors, fossil gas and electricity constitute the biggest source of final energy use (56% and 30% respectively in 2021).

The economic impact of high energy prices and short-term saving measures will likely be highest for energy intensive industries with high fossil gas demand and low substitution opportunities, such as ammonia production. Estimates show that potential gas supply cuts would lead to the interruption of chemical production and other related integrated value chains in Bulgaria. Due to strong interdependencies between these industries, it is crucial to avoid cascading effects and related costs and to aim for structural changes in consumption patterns in the industries.

Accelerating the natural gas phaseout

The skyrocketing natural gas prices in 2022 have already created a strong economic incentive for industry players to invest in energy efficiency measures, alternative fuels, and technology switching, resulting in notable gas savings. However, further efforts are necessary to bring lasting changes in long-term business decisions to unlock the industry’s potential for implementing energy efficiency measures and fostering innovation. Hence, industrial players have large capacity to significantly cut gas demand by 2030, thus enhancing national energy and climate security.¹

The phase-out of natural gas in the industrial sector requires a comprehensive approach that considers the diverse range of applications and the specific temperature requirements of various industrial processes. For example, cement and virgin steel production require very high temperatures (>1000°C) for which direct electrification solutions are not yet fully developed. In such cases, the utilisation of waste and biomass as co-firing options can be explored to meet the heat demand.

It is important to note that direct electrification solutions have already become competitive for low and medium-temperature industrial processes. The utilisation of natural gas in these processes is highly inefficient and results in the underutilisation of the fuel’s potential as using gas in these activities contributes to enormous energy waste. Industrial high-temperature heat pumps, characterised by their energy efficiency, can provide heat up to 200°C, surpassing the performance of natural gas in terms of overall energy consumption. Consequently, they present a suitable solution for industries such as food, paper, textiles, and ceramics (for drying purposes). These technologies have the potential to largely replace centralised steam production that relies on fossil gas and coal, including both boilers and combined heat and power plants, by 2030.

For low-temperature processes, other energy efficiency measures, such as improved insulation of industrial buildings and enhanced waste heat recovery, also offer significant potential for reducing overall energy demand, particularly gas demand. Electric boilers, particularly when combined with renewable energy sources for self-consumption, as well as concentrated solar power technologies (with a greater market uptake expected after 2030), are highly suitable for medium and even high-temperature processes. Furthermore, these technologies provide industrial players with an additional opportunity to monetise their heat storage systems by offering demand response services for balancing the electricity market.

Drivers for structural gas demand reduction

The structural transformation away from fossil gas proceeds at different speeds across the various sub-sectors. The largest reductions in fossil gas consumption up to 2030, relative to 2018 levels, can be achieved in the machinery and transport equipment (-0.29 TWh, -53%), pulp and paper (-0.29 TWh, -57%), food and beverage and tobacco (-0.22 TWh, -21%), and chemicals (-0.63 TWh, -16%), iron and steel (-0.33 TWh, -37%) sub-sectors. The residual fossil gas consumption after 2030 is found in the sub-sectors chemicals and ’other minerals’ (bricks and ceramics among others), where the uptake of low-carbon technologies proceeds more slowly.¹

Fossil gas demand declines initially in the medium- and low-temperature segments through efficiency measures and direct electrification of heating processes. Demand reduction for space heating is spread across different sub-sectors and is driven by the deployment of low-temperature heat pumps and efficiency increases in industrial buildings, through building insulation by 2030. Concentrated solar power (CSP) can produce steam for the chemical sector, starting before 2030, but increasing significantly from 2030 to 2040, in hybrid operation with other technologies.

For mid-temperature steam production, reductions are achieved through the deployment of high-temperature heat pumps for temperatures up to 200 °C, and electric boilers for higher temperatures. These technologies largely replace centralised steam production based on fossil gas and coal, including both boilers and combined heat and power (CHP) plants by 2030.

For the food, beverage and tobacco industry, current consumption is mainly driven by space heating and heating over 100°C. Reduction is driven by a significant upscaling of low temperature heat pumps and relatively lower introduction of high temperature heat pumps, as well as the increased use of electric boilers and electric ovens.

Significant reductions in fossil gas demand are also achieved in this decade for high temperature heat production above 500°C. A variety of technologies are used, including electric, hydrogen, waste, and biomass-based ovens, as well as electrified steam cracking furnaces in the chemicals sectors.

Policy action for a low-carbon transformation

Bulgaria’s current strategic framework does not pay enough attention to the challenges of industrial decarbonisation, as the primary focus has been the low-carbon transition of the energy sector. The reduction of industrial emissions would require the lowering of energy demand, the electrification of energy consumption on the back of widespread adoption of decentralised renewable energy-based power plants, and the optimisation of material use towards circular economy. The surge in energy prices since 2021 has placed additional pressure on industrial energy consumers to cut demand and decarbonise.

Deep decarbonisation of the industry sector demands a structural shift in all industrial production processes, particularly in sectors such as chemicals, iron, steelmaking, cement, and ceramics, which currently have poor sustainability performance. The industrial transition process would also involve a shift towards lighter industries with higher added value. Decarbonising power and heat demand are crucial as they contribute to two-thirds of the country’s total GHG emissions. Expected efficiency gains can be achieved using more efficient materials, product reuse, improved manufacturing processes, and smart product designs. Reducing energy consumption requires comprehensive energy efficiency programs that go beyond enhancing insulation or introducing more efficient equipment. It involves optimising the entire production process to minimise energy losses and maximise energy reuse through sophisticated heat recycling approaches. These efficiency gains would have the most significant impact on carbon emissions reduction in heavy industries, where synthetic fuels should replace fossil fuels in sectors such as steel, aluminium, non-ferrous, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, ammonia, chlorine, olefins, and other chemicals.¹

For non-specific energy use in industrial production, renewable energy-based electricity should be the primary source. Many large-scale and energy-intensive businesses in Bulgaria have already chosen to develop solar-based power plants for their own use, either by owning the generation facilities or through corporate power purchase agreements (PPAs) with renewable energy developers for direct electricity transfers, bypassing the electricity grid. Decentralised renewable energy-based systems are becoming increasingly popular as companies aim to minimise transmission and administrative costs. Regulatory changes implemented since 2015 have facilitated direct connections between companies and renewable energy plants, reducing their tax burden on electricity consumption and streamlining administrative procedures for connecting new renewable energy systems.

What’s next?

In line with the expected energy demand growth in the industrial sector, the challenge to lower the energy intensity of heavy industry, and the delayed modernisation of industrial technologies, the Bulgarian government would need to provide strong state support to meet the long-term decarbonisation goals. These could be in the form of tax incentives, loan programs, and high manufacturing standards for business projects optimising internal manufacturing processes to keep up with the EU Industrial Strategy.

For Bulgaria to introduce costly new technologies to adjust to more sustainable production, lower energy intensity, and the optimisation of resource efficiency, the government needs to adopt a roadmap for a circular economy and a low-carbon industrial transition in line with the major objectives of the EU Industrial Strategy. This means the introduction of targeted incentives for businesses in developing circular economy supply chains with high material efficiency.

In the chemical industry, which accounts for roughly 40% of total GHG emissions and energy demand in industry, the use of natural gas should be gradually phased out in favour of synthetic fuels and hydrogen. Pilot projects involving the integration of these alternative fuels into the supply chains of fertilisers and basic chemical manufacturers should be prioritised by the government.

The government should make it easier for businesses to enter into corporate power purchase agreements (PPAs), in which they can invest in the development of renewable energy-based power producing units for their own consumption. This would necessitate the elimination of administrative burdens for the installation of new plants, as well as close coordination with the transmission system operator (ESO) and distribution system operators (DSO), who can better streamline capacity addition approval processes and improve long-term planning for infrastructure upgrades to allow for faster integration of business-linked RES plants.

The anticipated investments in the National Recovery and Resilience Plan’s low-carbon transition of enterprises through the integration of RES plants are overly focused on the introduction of power storage technology, which is currently the most expensive technological solution. This restricts the program’s entire coverage to a small number of enterprises, resulting in only a minimal uptake of renewables among SMEs.

Instead of focusing solely on renewable energy self-consumption, the government should collaborate with DSOs to implement effective net-metering systems, allowing companies to become active power market players.

Economic restructuring is required to shift away from reliance on resource extraction and toward increased manufacturing of items with higher value-added. Higher recycling rates for plastics, metals, and other carbon-intensive items will be critical.

Hungary

Current industry landscape

The manufacturing sector¹ in Hungary contributes to a significant share of the country’s economic growth (22% of the GDP in 2018), job creation (half a million employees, representing 11% of the active population in 2018) but also greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (35% of the country’s GHG in 2018).²

The fabricated metals industry³ contributes to the highest share of economic growth and job creation (19% of jobs in the manufacturing sector in 2018).⁴

The chemicals industry is the biggest emitter, and an contributor to the economy. The subsector contributed to 10% of the value added in manufacturing and a quarter of manufacturing-related GHG emissions in 2018.⁵ These emissions have been increasing irregularly since 2015.⁶

This is mainly driven by the production of plastics and fertilizers. The Tiszaújváros petrochemical cluster has two steam crackers and relies on naphtha from the Százhalombatta refinery.⁷

The fertilizer company Nitrogénművek in Petfuerdo has a production capacity of ammonia of approximately 2,000 kt/a.⁸ The company secured funding for green hydrogen and ammonia generation (RES-E and electrolysis). Initial investment will replace 10% of capacities with RES based fertilizers.

The MOL Group’s Danube Refinery in Százhalombatta plan to enhance efficiency and invest in high value-added refinery products: converting 1.8 million tons of fuels to more valuable petrochemical feedstock by 2030.⁹

Although the steel industry holds the most important historic share of greenhouse gas emissions in the country (16.15 Mio tonnes since 2015 – less than 0.1% of global steel emissions), these have decreased since 2018.¹⁰ During that year the sector contributed to 19% of all GHG emissions from the energy intensive industries in Hungary.¹¹

Hungary has one iron and steel plant operating at Dunaújváros (ISD Dunaferr) based on blast furnace with a steel capacity of 1.3 Mt p.a. and iron capacity of 1 Mt p.a. No further investments on efficiency are expected at the moment, and no investments in low carbon steel technologies have been announced.¹²

The investment decisions of the 2020s in the sector will be of crucial importance: a reinvestment into coal-based blast furnaces (15 to 20 years) would create a carbon lock in. This present high risks for future stranded assets, putting jobs at risk (an estimate of 4000 jobs in Hungary currently) and putting any pathways compatible with 1.5 degrees out of reach.

The Cement industry has contributed to a smaller share of GHG emissions in Hungary in 2018 (10%), but its emissions have been rising since 2015 (mostly process-related emissions).¹³ Hungary has 2 cement clinkers. Its main cement plant, Miskolc, was closed in 2011. Two plants are operating in the south of the country, Duna-Dráva Cement and Lafarge.¹⁴

Finally, manufacturing of machinery and transport equipment represents a significant part of Hungarian economy (38% of value added in manufacturing in 2018). The volume of manufacture of transport equipment is the highest across all manufacturing industries and the sector has been growing.¹⁵

Status quo fossil gas demand in industry

By order of magnitude, the chemicals, food, beverage & tobacco and machinery and transport equipment industries had the biggest fossil gas demand in 2018 across all other industries.

For these industries, fossil gas represents the majority the final energy use (half for the chemicals, and food, beverage and tobacco industries, 40% for machinery and transport equipment – this is mostly driven by heat demand for space heating). The rest mostly comes electricity or biomass.

Across all industrial sectors, fossil gas constitutes on average the biggest source of energy use (36% in 2018), whilst electricity represents 30% of the final energy use.¹

The chemical industry consumes a significant proportion of fossil gas for several uses, namely as feedstock for chemical processes, energy source, process heat, catalyst regeneration and combined heat and power (CHP) systems.

The economic impact of high energy prices and short-term saving measures is expected to be the highest for energy intensive industries with high material use of fossil gas and low substitution opportunities, such as ammonia production. The reduction of fossil gas use for material for the sector will be considerable but is estimated to ensure that the demand for fossil gas for materials is sufficient to prevent the production of chemicals and other integrated value chains in Hungary from being interrupted. Due to strong interdependencies between these industries, it is crucial to avoid cascading effects and related costs and to aim for structural changes in the consumption pattern in the industry.

Drivers for structural gas demand reduction

The structural transformation away from fossil gas proceeds at different speeds across the various sub-sectors. The largest reductions in fossil gas consumption up to 2030, relative to 2018 levels, can be achieved in the chemicals (-3 TWh, -44%),¹ and machinery and transport equipment (-0,99 TWh, -34%), food and beverage and tobacco subsectors (-1,1 TWh, -29%), with the pulp and paper industry completely phasing out fossil gas demand already in 2025 (-0.55 TWh). The residual fossil gas consumption after 2030 is found in the chemicals; food, beverage and tobacco; iron and steel and minerals sub-sectors.

Fossil gas demand is largely reduced initially in the medium- and low-temperature segments through efficiency measures and direct electrification of heating processes.

Demand reduction for space heating is spread across different sub-sectors and is driven by the deployment of low-temperature heat pumps and efficiency increases in industrial buildings, through building insulation by 2030.

For mid-temperature steam production, reductions are achieved through the deployment of high-temperature heat pumps for temperatures up to 200 degrees Celsius, and electric boilers for higher temperatures. These technologies largely replace centralised steam production based on fossil gas and coal, including both boilers and combined heat and power (CHP) plants by 2030.

For the food, beverage and tobacco industry, current consumption is mainly driven by space heating and heating over 100 degrees Celsius. Reduction is driven by a significant scale up of low temperature heat pumps and relatively lower scale up of high temperature heat pumps, as well as scale up of electric boilers and electric ovens.

Significant reductions in fossil gas demand are also achieved in this decade for high temperature heat production above 500 degrees Celsius. A variety of technologies are used, including electric, hydrogen, waste, and biomass ovens, as well as electrified steam cracking furnaces in the chemicals sectors.

In the chemicals industry, one steam cracker at Tisza would be partly modernised until 2030 and aligned to the use of secondary feedstock (substituting straight-run naphtha), the second would be decommissioned. Due to steam cracker modernisation, growing amounts of by-gases can be fired to produce steam for downstream operations (and substitute fossil gas use). Import infrastructure for naphtha is required already in the mid-term (2030). Finally, changes in production of ammonia and fertilizer production are expected due to lower fertilizer demand throughout Europe.

By investing during the 2020s in electric Arc Furnaces (EAC) rather than in Direct Reduced Iron (DRI), the Hungarian iron and steel industry can achieve some gas demand reductions already by 2030. Due to high quality requirements in the rolling plants (flat steel), the plant cannot rely on scrap only. Intra-EU DRI imports could come from Spain or Sweden, as it will not be available in Hungary.

The pathway foresees an increase of a quarter of the fossil gas demand of the lime industry, and a slight increase by the aluminium industry (3,6%).

In the long run, changes in demand patterns could help reduce fossil gas demand: Lime and cement demand would decrease due to reduced demand from steel and coal power plants, material efficiency in buildings, whilst demand for flat glass might increase (additional demand for thermal insulation). Compared to cement, flat glass production uses mostly fossil gas.

Policy recommendations

Policy levers to electrify heat: provide financial incentives for heat pump purchases, change tax measures that disadvantage electrification, and scale up support for industrial electrification. A national strategy to electrify heat would help to ensure the scale up of pilot projects, creating strong economic incentives, improve training, and can be linked with relevant measures to ensure power prices stay stable and relative to gas prices in the long term.

Special subsidy program: Temporary, pro-rata funding of capital costs for heat pumps and electric boilers, incl. Grid connection and integration to make sure the power system can cope in future with further electrification.

Zero Carbon Standard: Legal requirement that all new investments in plants for the generation of industrial low-temperature process heat must comply with a zero-carbon standard, which in this case means phasing out fossil fuels by the year 2035.

Energy efficiency: provide support for industrial energy efficiency programmes that can realise immediate savings (IEA, 2022).

More rapid deployment of renewables: reduce permitting timelines, Network tariff reform

Reducing the price of electricity from renewable energy: State covering of default risks for companies in green power PPAs.

Financial support: carbon contracts and carbon contracts for difference (CCfD): covers the incremental costs of investing and operating key low carbon technologies by remunerating the resulting emission reductions, possibly relative to the CO2 price. CCfDs complement the effects of the EU ETS and compensate for insufficient and variable carbon prices. CCfDs can also be used for clean hydrogen support.

Green financing instruments: create a credit institute to provide low-interest loans solely for financing investments in climate mitigation.

Green public procurement: ensure that public spending is made in accordance with obligatory sustainability criteria in order to create lead markets for low carbon and GHG neutral products. The requirements create secure markets for sustainably manufactured products (for steel, cement and vehicles in particular).

Clean hydrogen support policies: introduce support instruments that create a business case for clean hydrogen

Standards for recyclable products.

Changes in construction and product standards to facilitate material efficiency and substitution and increase the recyclability of construction materials.

Italy

Current industry landscape

The manufacturing sector¹ in Italy is the second most important sector in terms of economic growth after the service sector (20% of the country’s GDP in 2021)² and job creation (15 percent of the active population).³ Industrial production is however decreasing in the country, with a 15.7 percent contraction between 2005 and 2021 due to a shift towards a more service-based economy. Industrial activity is mostly concentrated in the north, while people in southern regionds mainly work in agriculture and tourism.⁴

Italy’s industrial economy is mostly specialised in the manufacture of machinery and equipment (15.6% of the industrial value added in 2020⁵ and 13.2% of jobs in the manufacturing sector in 2020⁶) and fabricated metal products (18.8% of jobs in the manufacturing sector in 2020).⁷

By an order of magnitude, the most carbon intensive industrial sub-sectors in Italy are iron and steel (15% of GHG emissions from the manufacturing sector in 2018), refineries (14%) and cement (12%).⁸

Emissions from the steel industry have been steadily increasing year on year until 2018, but the suspension of production in several plants due to the pandemic led to a sharp drop in 2020. In 2021, the emissions remained slightly lower than in 2015.⁹ Italy has several steel production sites mostly concentrated in the North of the country with a combined production capacity of several million tonnes per year. Secondary steel production is the highest in Italy among the EU member states (21.6 Mt in 2022).¹⁰

The bulk of steel production capacity consists of electric arc furnace. In 2022 85% of the steel produced in Italy is from scrap melted in electric arc furnaces: The blast furnace in Taranto produces about 3-4 Mt per year of steel, however Acciaierie d’Italia is planning to build a direct reduction iron plant.

The other locations are operating with electric arc furnaces, such as several electric arc furnaces in the north of the country. The biggest one is in Cremona, Lombardy, with 3.9 Mt p.a. of steel capacity.¹¹

Steel companies in Italy announced a combined future (additional) capacity of 2.5 Mt of steel p.a. through the build-up of electric arc furnaces by 2030.

The cement industry is the most important in terms of production volumes (10% of total EU+UK, over 16 000 kt in 2018, over 19 000 kt in 2021) and it is responsible for 10% of the manufacturing sector’s emissions in the country in 2018.¹²

The chemical industry is diverse and located at several regional clusters. The industry emitted 10% of the manufacturing sector’s carbon emissions in the country in 2018 and 15% in 2021.

Status quo fossil gas demand in industry

By order of magnitude, the chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery and transport equipment industries had the biggest fossil gas demand in 2018 across all other industries, while the non metallic minerals, chemical, pulp, paper and printing industries had the biggest fossil gas demand in 2021 across all other industries.

For the chemicals and machinery and transport equipment industries, fossil gas represents the majority (around 40%) of the final energy use (for machinery and transport equipment – this is mostly driven by heat demand for space heating). The rest is mostly supplied by electricity or biomass. For the steel industry, a quarter of the final energy use comes from fossil gas whilst 29% comes from electricity and 19% from steam coal.

The chemical industry consumes a significant share of fossil gas for several uses, namely as feedstock for chemical processes, energy source, process heat, catalyst regeneration and combined heat and power (CHP) systems.

The economic impact of high energy prices and short-term saving measures is expected to be the highest for energy intensive industries with high material use of fossil gas and low substitution opportunities, such as ammonia production. The reduction of fossil gas use for material for the sector will be considerable but is estimated to ensure that the demand for fossil gas for materials is sufficient to prevent the production of chemicals and other integrated value chains in Italy from being interrupted. Due to strong interdependencies between these industries, it is crucial to avoid cascading effects and related costs and to aim for structural changes in the consumption pattern in the industry.

Drivers for structural gas demand reduction

The structural transformation away from fossil gas proceeds at different speeds across the various sub-sectors. The largest reductions in fossil gas consumption up to 2030, relative to 2018 levels, can be achieved in the machinery and transport equipment (-9,4 TWh, -60%), pulp and paper (-2.92 TWh, 40%), food and beverage and tobacco (-4,9 TWh, -38%), and chemicals (-5.90 TWh, -36%) sub-sectors. The residual fossil gas consumption after 2030 is found in the chemicals, iron and steel and minerals sub-sectors.

Fossil gas demand is largely reduced initially in the medium- and low-temperature segments through efficiency measures and direct electrification of heating processes.

By investing during the 2020s in direct reduced processes based on renewable hydrogen to replace coal-based blast furnaces, the steel industry can achieve steep reductions in fossil gas demand after 2030. Significant reductions can additionally be reached through the use of more scrap (material circularity).¹ The Taranto plant can be converted to an electric arc furnace (EAC) and a DRI site could be commissioned in 2028, with a capacity of 1 200 kt p.a. The conversion could be commissioned, at least in part, earlier than 2028 with the help of the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan and the investment of one billion euros for the construction of a DRI plant, which must be spent by 2026. Using the fund would make mandatory a blend of at least 10 percent hydrogen in the energy mix.

The Gas Exit pathway does not foresee reductions in the cement industry by 2030.

The pathway foresees that refineries reach negative emissions by 2030 (-5 TWh in 2030) through the closing of further non petchem-integrated refinery sites due to decreasing demand and to drive down today’s export surpluses (Falconara, Messina, Priolo, Sarroch, Siracusa); LPG outputs however remain almost stable (deeply integrated refining sites with higher yields kept in operation).

Finally, the pathway foresees a slight increase in the fossil gas demand of the aluminium industry (3%).

Policy recommendations

Identification of a comprehensive strategy for the decarbonisation of the Italian manufacturing industry. To activate a significant volume of investments it is not enough to propose a series of projects, but it is necessary to draw up a coherent overall vision. Without a targeted policy and action plan on the transition of industry, there is the risk that the resources available would be used ineffectively, without a significant cut in GHG emissions.

A national strategy to electrify low and medium temperature heat would help to ensure the scale up of pilot projects, creating strong economic incentives, improve training, and can be linked with relevant measures to ensure power prices stay stable and relative to gas prices in the long term. In Italy the mechanism of White Certificates has resulted in a saving of 29.1 Mtoe since its introduction in 2005. The restoration of this mechanism and a relaunch of a version more focused on interventions that reduce the consumption of fossil fuels as well as direct emissions via electrification would allow for further reductions in energy consumption and GHG emissions in the industrial sector.

Technological innovation can be supported by targeted policies. In this regard carbon contracts and carbon contracts for difference (CCfD) can cover the incremental costs of investing and operating key low-carbon technologies by remunerating emission reductions, possibly relative to the CO2 price. CCfDs complement the effects of the EU ETS and compensate for insufficient and variable carbon prices. CCfDs can also be used for clean hydrogen support.

The decarbonisation of materials passes through the reduction of emissions from production processes and the creation of a market of products with low carbon impact. In this context Green Public Procurement can play a key role. National legislation already requires the adoption of Minimum Environmental Criteria (CAM – Criteri Ambientali Minimi) in public procurement, however at the moment CAMs don’t provide for specific constraints on the carbon impact of purchased products. A revision of CAMs is needed to consider the GHG emissions from the entire product life cycle.

Standards to define the characteristics of “green” or “low carbon” products are fundamental to support Green Public Procurement. In the absence of shared standards, possibly at EU level, the risk of greenwashing and disorientation of buyers and consumers is high.

Poland

Current industry landscape

Poland has a fast growing industry: its industrial output in 2021 was more than double its 2005 level.¹ In 2018, the manufacturing sector accounted for 16.8 percent of Poland’s GDP,² with the manufacture of food products as the highest subsector in terms of value added.³ The manufacturing industry had around 3.5 million employees in 2018 (20% of active population), of which 23 percent worked in the food products industry.⁴

The manufacturing sector in Poland is the most carbon intensive, it contributed to an estimated 17.9 percent of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2018.⁵

Cement contributes to a significant share of the country’s industry-related greenhouse gas emissions (15.5 percent of overall GHG emissions in 2018).⁶ The sectors’ emissions have been slightly increasing between 2015 and 2020, with a slight decrease in 2021.⁷

Two most important cement clinkers are in Chorula and Karsy (both with over 4.000 kt/a of production capacity), followed by clinkers in Warta and Chelm (approx. 3,0000 kt/a in 2018).⁸

In 2018, the steel industry had the highest share of GHG emissions across all energy-intensive industries (18 percent),⁹ though the sector’s GHG emissions have been declining by 21 percent since 2015.¹⁰ The sector has felt the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the inflation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced some companies to make temporary plant closures permanent (e.g. ArcelorMittal’s Krakow plant).

The other ArcelorMittal plant near Katowice (Dąbrowa Górnicza) uses a blast furnace with a steel capacity of 5.8 Mt p.a. and so far has not announced further transformation plans.¹¹

Currently, 38.7 percent of the blast furnace capacity in Poland will reach its technical end-of-life by 2025, and another 38.7 percent by 2030; the remaining 22.5 percent by 2040. As such, the blast furnace fleet will already require reinvestment by 2025.¹² The investment decisions of the 2020s in the sector will be of crucial importance: a reinvestment into coal-based blast furnaces (15 to 20 years) would create a carbon lock in. This presents high risks for future stranded assets, putting jobs at risk (up to 12 500 jobs by 2030, and another 3 500 after 2030) and putting any pathways compatible with a 1.5 degree trajectory out of reach.

Chemicals contribute to a lower share (10 percent) of the countries’ overall GHG emissions across all energy intensive sectors. GHG emissions from this sector have been rising since 2015,¹³ with a sharp growth since 2020 (25 percent higher than 2015 levels).

The country has steam crackers in Płock with a production capacity of approx. 2,500 kt/a of mainly petrochemical products.

Status quo fossil gas demand in industry

By order of magnitude, the chemicals, food, beverage & tobacco and glass industries had the biggest fossil gas demand in 2018 across all other industries.

Across all industrial sectors, fossil gas constitutes the biggest source of energy use (36 percent on average in 2018, 29 percent in 2021), whilst electricity represents 30 percent of the final energy use on average in 2018, 23 percent in 2021. The share of fossil gas in final energy use is significantly higher in the chemicals (65 percent) or glass industries (75 percent). The share of electricity is the highest in the machinery and transport equipment sector (55 percent in 2018 and 56 percent in 2021).¹

The economic impact of high energy prices and short-term saving measures is expected to be the highest for energy intensive industries with high material use of fossil gas and low substitution opportunities, such as ammonia production. The reduction of fossil gas use for material for the sector will be considerable but is estimated to ensure that the demand for fossil gas for materials is sufficient to prevent the production of chemicals and other integrated value chains in Poland from being interrupted. Due to strong interdependencies between these industries, it is crucial to avoid cascading effects and related costs and to aim for structural changes in the consumption pattern in the industry.

Less strong effects are expected for the energetic use, in which case fossil gas can be partially replaced with alternative fuels. The actual costs and macroeconomic impact will therefore also depend on the further price development of oil, coal, biomass and other substitute fuels, not to mention the effect of the regulatory environment (e.g. incentives to electrify or switch fuel source, the availability of Power Purchasing Agreements, direct electricity lines) and technology costs, such as the capex needs of heat pumps.

Drivers for structural gas demand reduction

The structural transformation away from fossil gas proceeds at different speeds across the various sub-sectors. The largest reductions in fossil gas consumption up to 2030, relative to 2018 levels, can be achieved in the machinery and transport equipment (-1.7 TWh, -42 percent), pulp and paper (-1.04 TWh, 44 percent), chemicals (-5.36 TWh, -23 percent) and iron and steel (-0.63 TWh, -20 percent) sub-sectors. The residual fossil gas consumption after 2030 is found in the chemicals; food, beverage and tobacco; and glass sub-sectors.

Fossil gas demand is largely reduced initially in the medium- and low-temperature segments through efficiency measures and direct electrification of heating processes.

The pathway foresees an increase of a quarter of the fossil gas demand of the lime industry, and a slight increase by the aluminium industry (4 percent).

Policy recommendations

A national industrial decarbonization strategy is key to integrate all relevant measures and provide a clear timeline for industries and investors to prepare, signalling where investments will be needed in the future.

Energy efficiency: providing support for industrial energy efficiency programmes that can realise immediate savings (IEA, 2022)

Access to clan energy: Supporting a ramp up of renewables, for instance by reducing permitting timelines, supporting in the planning and financing infrastructure development, reducing the price of electricity from renewable energy, and state covering of default risks for companies in green power PPAs.

Special subsidy program: Temporary, pro-rata funding of capital costs for all decarbonization options including heat pumps and electric boilers, incl. Grid connection and integration.

Clean hydrogen support policies: introducing an operating support instrument that makes green hydrogen a better business case than grey hydrogen, for example through CCfDs.

Green financing instruments: creating a credit institute to provide low-interest loans solely for financing investments in climate mitigation

Romania

Current industry landscape

The manufacturing sector¹ in Romania contributes to a significant share of the country’s economic growth (19% of the GDP in 2018), job creation (19% of the active population in 2018) but also greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (38% of the country’s GHG in 2018).²

The food products industry³ contributes to the highest share of economic growth and job creation (a quarter of the employees working in manufacturingin 2018).⁴

The iron and steel industry contributes to the highest share of GHG emissions from the energy intensive sectors (28% of overall GHG emissions across sectors in 2018),⁵ though they have been declining since 2017.⁶

The steel industry in Romania has made investment announcements in low carbon steel: 2.5-4 Mt p.a. direct reduced iron (DRI). The existing blast furnace in Galati (3 Mt p.a. of steel capacity) will be replaced in 2025 by two electric arc furnaces (EAFs) with a finished steel products capacity of 2.85 Mt p.a. This will allow the Romanian mill to be more flexible by using hot metal, directed reduced iron (DRI/HBI) and scrap steel in the charge mix.7 Romania also has 6 smaller plans using EAF with a production capacity lower than 1 Mt p.a.⁸

The second most carbon intensive industry is the cement industry (21% of overall GHG in 2018), the sector’s emissions have been irregularly increasing since 2016.⁹

Romania has 7 cement clinkers for a total of 16 Mt of production capacity p.a.¹⁰

The third most carbon intensive sector is the chemicals industry (10% of overall GHG in 2018). The industry’s emissions have been irregularly increasing since 2015.¹¹

The industry has a steam cracker in Pitesti with approx. 1 Mt p.a. of production capacity.

For a detailed landscape of the industry in Romania, please refer to the policy paper Decarbonising Romania’s industry published by the Energy Policy Group in March 2023.

Status quo fossil gas demand in industry

By order of magnitude, the chemicals, food, beverage and tobacco and machinery and transport equipment industries had the biggest fossil gas demand in 2018 across all other industries.¹

For these industries, fossil gas represents the majority the final energy use (80% for the chemical industry, half for the food, beverage and tobacco industry, and 41% for machinery and transport equipment – the latter mostly driven by heat demand for space heating). The remaining energy use is mostly supplied by electricity or biomass.

Similarly, across all other industrial sectors, fossil gas constitutes the biggest source of energy use (36% in 2018), whilst electricity represents 30% of the final energy use.

The economic impact of high energy prices and short-term saving measures is expected to be the highest for energy intensive industries with high material use of fossil gas and low substitution opportunities, such as ammonia production. The reduction of fossil gas use for material for the sector will be considerable but is estimated to ensure that the demand for fossil gas for materials is sufficient to prevent the production of chemicals and other integrated value chains in Romania from being interrupted. Due to strong interdependencies between these industries, it is crucial to avoid cascading effects and related costs and to aim for structural changes in the consumption pattern in the industry.

Drivers for structural gas demand reduction

The structural transformation away from fossil gas proceeds at different speeds across the various sub-sectors. The largest reductions in fossil gas consumption up to 2030, relative to 2018 levels, can be achieved in the lime (-1.19TWh, -54%), machinery and transport equipment (-1.70 TWh, -51%), food and beverage and tobacco (-0.69 TWh, -22%), and chemicals (-4.77 TWh, -35%) sub-sectors. The pulp and paper sub-sector almost completely phases out fossil gas demand in 2030. The residual fossil gas consumption after 2030 is found in the food, beverage and tobacco and ’other metals’ sub-sectors.¹

Fossil gas demand largely declines initially in the medium- and low-temperature segments through efficiency measures and direct electrification of heating processes.

For the food, beverage and tobacco industry, current consumption is mainly driven by space heating and heating over 100°C. Demand reduction is driven by a significant scale up of low temperature heat pumps and relatively lower scale up of high temperature heat pumps, as well as scale up of electric boilers and electric ovens.

For ceramics, there would be a good potential to apply heat pumps for drying purposes with temperatures <100°C (ca. 30% of today’s total heat demand), contributing to additional early fossil gas savings in 2030.

Significant reductions in fossil gas demand are also achieved in this decade for high temperature heat production above 500°C. A variety of technologies are used, including electric, hydrogen, waste, and biomass ovens, as well as electrified steam cracking furnaces in the chemicals sectors.

In the iron and steel industry, fossil gas consumption first increases, more than doubling between 2018 and 2030. The sector phases out fossil gas after 2030. Reductions in the steel industry are achieved after 2030 through investments in direct reduced processes based on renewable hydrogen to replace coal-based blast furnaces.²

The pathway also foresees an increase in fossil gas consumption in the aluminium industry (3,6%).

Policy recommendations

In the short term, appropriate compensatory measures for the industry should be set up in order to secure the production of strategically important basic materials in the long term, even in the event of temporary production declines. Such financial relief should be conditional on the respective company having deep decarbonisation plans.

Policy levers to electrify heat: provide financial incentives for heat pump purchases, change tax measures that disadvantage electrification, and scale up support for industrial electrification. A national strategy to electrify heat would help to ensure the scale up of pilot projects, creating strong economic incentives, improve training, and can be linked with relevant measures to ensure power prices stay stable and relative to gas prices in the long term.

Special subsidy program: Temporary, pro-rata funding of capital costs for heat pumps and electric boilers, incl. Grid connection and integration.

Zero Carbon Standard: Legal requirement that all new investments in plants for the generation of industrial low-temperature process heat must comply with a zero-carbon standard, which in this case means phasing out fossil fuels by the year 2035.

Energy efficiency: Accelerate the implementation of the energy efficiency programme implemented through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan and potentially increase the amount of available funding by using EU ETS revenues. Energy efficiency measures should only be supported for applications that do not require complete replacement for the deep decarbonisation of a facility.

More rapid deployment of renewables and power infrastructure: reduce permitting timelines, Network tariff reform to make sure enough green electricity and hydrogen is available regionally, e.g. at the Black Sea coast close to the steel industry.

Reducing the price of electricity from renewable energy: State covering of default risks for companies in green power PPAs.

Financial support: carbon contracts and carbon contracts for difference (CCfD): covers the incremental costs of investing and operating key low carbon technologies by remunerating the resulting emission reductions, possibly relative to the CO2 price. CCfDs complement the effects of the EU ETS and compensate for insufficient and variable carbon prices. CCfDs can also be used for clean hydrogen support.

Green financing instruments: create a credit institute to provide low-interest loans solely for financing investments in climate mitigation.

Green public procurement: ensure that public spending is made in accordance with obligatory sustainability criteria in order to create lead markets for low carbon and GHG neutral products. The requirements create secure markets for sustainably manufactured products (for steel, cement and vehicles in particular).

Clean hydrogen support policies: introduce support instruments that create a business case for clean hydrogen.

Changes in construction and product standards to facilitate material efficiency and substitution and increase the recyclability of construction materials.

EU Gas Exit Project

Additional parts of the study

Project Overview

National Pathways

Buildings Deep Dives

UNFCCC. <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents/627710">2023 GHG Inventory Submission for Bulgaria</a>

Agora Energiewende. <a href="https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=chemicals&time=2015-2021&country=BGR&gas=co2e100">Gas Exit Pathway for Bulgaria, Manufacturing sector</a>, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut, Climate Trace. 2023. (Refineries included in the calculations)

Excludes cement and lime (includes for instance clay, sand etc.)

Eurostat 2021. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NRG_BAL_S/default/table">Simplified Energy Balances</a>

Center for the Study of Democracy. <a href="https://csd.bg/publications/publication/the-future-of-natural-gas-in-southeast-europe/">The Future of Natural Gas in Southeast Europe</a>. Sofia, 2023.

Center for the Study of Democracy, <a href="https://csd.bg/publications/publication/breaking-free-natural-gas-security-and-decarbonization-in-southeast-europe/">Breaking Free: Natural Gas Security and Decarbonisation in Southeast Europe</a>, Policy Brief No. 130, March 2023.

10.

Center for the Study of Democracy, <a href="https://csd.bg/publications/publication/at-a-decarbonisation-crossroads/">At a Decarbonisation Crossroads</a>, Policy Brief No. 127, March 2023.

11.

Covers industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-3: including food, tobacco, textiles, wood, paper, chemicals, rubber and plastic non metallic mineral products, basic metals, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, and other transport equipments. (World Bank. 2023)

12.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019a, Value and distribution of gross  value added by industry—1995–2018 <a href="https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_qpt002d.html">https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_qpt002d.html</a>; OECD. 2021: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Hungary-2021-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Hungary-2021-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf</a>

13.

The Fabricated Metals market refers to the manufacturing of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment.

14.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). (2019)b. Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 2019. Retrieved from <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wdsd001a.html" target="_blank">https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wdsd001a.html</a>; <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/htmlpub/key-figures-on-european-business-2022/industry.html" target="_blank">Eurostat, 2022</a>, Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_NA_IND_R2__custom_5169216/default/table?lang=en">https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_NA_IND_R2__custom_5169216/default/table?lang=en</a>

15.

World Bank. 2023. Chemicals (%value added in manufacturing) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.MNF.CHEM.ZS.UN?locations=HU  Agora Energiewende. 2023. Gas Exit Pathway for Hungary, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut 

16.

Climate Trace, 2023: https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=chemicals&time=2015-2021&country=HUN&gas=co2e100#trends 

17.

Agora Energiewende. 2021. Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe: https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2020/2020_10_Clean_Industry_Package/A-EW_208_Strategies-Climate-Neutral-Industry-EU_Study_WEB.pdf 

18.

19.

MOL. 2030.- Strategy 2030+ – MOLGroup: https://molgroup.info/en/strategy-2030

20.

Climate Trace, 2023: https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=chemicals&time=2015-2021&country=HUN&gas=co2e100#trends

21.

Agora Energiewende. 2023. Gas Exit Pathway for Hungary, with Wuppertal Institute modelling

22.

Agora Energiewende. 2023. Gas Exit Pathway for Hungary, with Wuppertal Institute modelling

23.

Results from WI modelling, Climate Trace. 2023: https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=steel&time=2015-2021&country=HUN&gas=co2e100

24.

Hastorun and Trimmer. 2022. 2017-2018 Minerals Yearbook. Hungary. US Geological Survey. https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2017-18/myb3-2017-18-hungary.pdf

25.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 2018. Statistical report: Economy and society, January-April 2018. https://ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/gyor/jel/ejel1804.pdf?lang=en

26.

Agora Energiewende. 2023. Gas Exit Pathway for Hungary, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut

27.

Both for energetic and feedstock use

28.

29.

https://italiaindati.com/settori-economia-italiana/#:~:text=%E2%96%BA%20Sul%20PIL%20del%202021,agricolo%20e%20nel%20settore%20manifatturiero

30.

http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=12581

31.

EC Commission. 2023. EURES: Labour market information Italy. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://eures.ec.europa.eu/living-and-working/labour-market-information/labour-market-information-italy_en" target="_blank">https://eures.ec.europa.eu/living-and-working/labour-market-information/labour-market-information-italy_en</a>

32.

http://dati.istat.it/?lang=it&SubSessionId=27850752-41c8-491c-98df-a4551958d6c8

33.

http://dati.istat.it/?lang=it&SubSessionId=27850752-41c8-491c-98df-a4551958d6c8

34.

http://dati.istat.it/?lang=it&SubSessionId=27850752-41c8-491c-98df-a4551958d6c8

35.

Agora Energiewende. 2023a. Gas Exit Pathway for Italy, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut

36.

Climate Trace. 2023: Italy Manufacturing Sector. https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=chemicals&time=2015-2021&country=HUN&gas=co2e100#trends

37.

Federacciai

38.

Agora Energiewende. 2021. Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2020/2020_10_Clean_Industry_Package/A-EW_208_Strategies-Climate-Neutral-Industry-EU_Study_WEB.pdf" target="_blank">https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2020/2020_10_Clean_Industry_Package/A-EW_208_Strategies-Climate-Neutral-Industry-EU_Study_WEB.pdf</a>; Agora Energiewende. 2022. Global Steel Transformation Tracker. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/" target="_blank">https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/</a>, with input from partner think tank ECCO on size of Cremona steel plant

39.

Agora Energiewende. 2021.; Agora Energiewende.2023a.

40.

Agora Energiewende.2023b. Breaking free from fossil gas. https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2021/2021_07_EU_GEXIT/A-EW_292_Breaking_free_WEB.pdf

41.

Eurostat, 2022. Key Figures on European Business. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/htmlpub/key-figures-on-european-business-2022/industry.html

42.

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMA_10_A10__custom_7434775/default/table?lang=en

43.

World Bank. 2023. Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) in Poland: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.MNF.MTRN.ZS.UN?locations=PL" target="_blank">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.MNF.MTRN.ZS.UN?locations=PL</a>; Eurostat. 2022. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_NA_IND_R2__custom_5169216/default/table?lang=en" target="_blank">https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_NA_IND_R2__custom_5169216/default/table?lang=en</a>

44.

Eurostat 2023. Employment by A*10 industry breakdowns: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMA_10_A10_E__custom_7084931/default/table?lang=en">https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMA_10_A10_E__custom_7084931/default/table?lang=en</a> Polish Central Statistical Office: Employment, wages and salaries in the national economy in 2019 – preliminary data. <a href="https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market/working-employed-wages-and-salaries-cost-of-labour/employment-wages-and-salaries-in-the-national-economy-in-2019-preliminary-data,15,2.html">https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market/working-employed-wages-and-salaries-cost-of-labour/employment-wages-and-salaries-in-the-national-economy-in-2019-preliminary-data,15,2.html</a>

45.

All greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalent). Agora Energiewende. 2023a. Gas Exit Pathway for Poland, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut. Refineries included in the calculations.; EEA. 2023. Greenhouse gases – data viewer. <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/greenhouse-gases-viewer">https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/greenhouse-gases-viewer</a>

46.

Agora Energiewende. 2023a. EEA. 2023.

47.

Climate Trace. 2023. Manufacturing in Poland. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=steel&time=2015-2021&country=POL&gas=co2e100#trends" target="_blank">https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=steel&time=2015-2021&country=POL&gas=co2e100#trends</a>;

48.

Agora Energiewende. 2021. Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2020/2020_10_Clean_Industry_Package/A-EW_208_Strategies-Climate-Neutral-Industry-EU_Study_WEB.pdf" target="_blank">https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2020/2020_10_Clean_Industry_Package/A-EW_208_Strategies-Climate-Neutral-Industry-EU_Study_WEB.pdf</a>; UNFCCC_v26 <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://sdi.eea.europa.eu/data/0569441f-2853-4664-a7cd-db969ef54de0" target="_blank">https://sdi.eea.europa.eu/data/0569441f-2853-4664-a7cd-db969ef54de0</a>

49.

Agora Energiewende. 2023a.EEA. 2023

50.

Climate Trace. 2023. 

51.

Agora Energiewende. 2022. Global Steel Transformation Tracker: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/" target="_blank">https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/</a>

52.

Agora Energiewende. 2021.

53.

https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&subsector=steel&time=2015-2021&country=POL&gas=co2e100#trends

54.

Agora Energiewende. 2023a.

55.

 Agora Energiewende.2023b. Breaking free from fossil gas. https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2021/2021_07_EU_GEXIT/A-EW_292_Breaking_free_WEB.pdf

56.

57.

<a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_NA_IND_R2__custom_5169216/default/table?lang=en" target="_blank">Eurostat 2022</a>; Romanian National Institute of Statistics: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://insse.ro/cms/ro/content/angajarea-%C3%AEn-economia-na%C8%9Bional%C4%83-%C3%AEn-anul-2018" target="_blank">https://insse.ro/cms/ro/content/angajarea-%C3%AEn-economia-na%C8%9Bional%C4%83-%C3%AEn-anul-2018</a>; <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/rou_nc5_resbmit.pdf" target="_blank">Romanian National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) 2020</a>; Agora Energiewende. 2023a. Gas Exit Pathway for Romania, Agora with modelling from Wuppertal Institut. Refineries excluded from the calculations.

58.

The Fabricated Metals market refers to the manufacturing of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment. 

59.

60.

Sectors included: pulp and paper, product use, other minerals, other metals, machinery and transport, lime, iron steel, glass, food, DH, chemicals, cement and aluminium, refineries. Results from Wuppertal modelling 2023.

61.

Climate Trace, 2022. Romanian manufacturing sector. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&time=2015-2015-2021&country=ROU&gas=co2e100#trends" target="_blank">https://climatetrace.org/inventory?sector=manufacturing&time=2015-2015-2021&country=ROU&gas=co2e100#trends</a>

62.

https://eurometal.net/liberty-acquires-dongbu-eaf-strip-mill-for-galati/

63.

Agora Energiewende (2022) Global Steel Transformation Tracker: <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/" target="_blank">https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/service/global-steel-transformation-tracker/</a>

64.

Climate Trace, 2022

65.

Energy Policy Group (2023), Decarbonising Romania’s industry 

66.

Ibid.

67.

Fossil gas demand from refineries is excluded from the calculations.  

68.

‘Other minerals’ refers to the manufacturing of all minerals except cement, glass and lime. ‘Other metals’ refers to the manufacturing of all metals except iron and steel. 

69.

Agora Energiewende.2023b. Breaking free from fossil gas. <a href="https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2021/2021_07_EU_GEXIT/A-EW_292_Breaking_free_WEB.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2021/2021_07_EU_GEXIT/A-EW_292_Breaking_free_WEB.pdf</a>